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GENERAL STATEMENT REGARDING BRIEF
It is not Frontier/Layton1s intention or purpose to address
all of the points raised in Thiokolfs brief.

To the extent that

a particular argument or issue is not dealt with in this brief that
should not be deemed as a waiver or concession on any point.
Frontier/Layton

believes

that

those

issues

have

been

argued

adequately in their principal brief.
Frontier/Layton

further recognize that most of the issues

addressed in this reply brief were addressed in their principal
brief.

However, because Thiokol is once again arguing its case

under the Federal holding of Weeks Dredging Contracting, Inc. v.
U.S., 13 CI. Ct. 193 (1987), afffd 861 F. 2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
some points need to be further clarified in terms of that analysis.
In addition, Thiokolfs brief, in some instances, states only half
of the issues or incorrectly states the issues and a clarification
is in order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE BORING LOGS WERE PART OF THE
CONTRACT DOCUMENTS

Thiokolfs statement of Issue No. 1 that "the logs . . . were
not part of the contract, and were provided for information only.11
(P.l

Issue

statement

1

"(3)

Statement

of

[t]hat they

the

Issues),

and

again

Thiokol!s

[boring logs] were not part of the

contract documents," (p.18 Thiokol Brief) [words added] are both
inaccurate and misleading statements and are contrary to Thiokolfs
own statements in its brief.

Perhaps Thiokol has confused the
1

soils report which was not included in the contract documents with
the boring logs which were included.

If one looks at Thiokolfs

parenthetical statement of the facts at 2(e) it says "copy of the
log of soil borings from a building site over 1400 feet away is
included

with

the

specif ications.ff

[emphasis

added].

That

statement clearly suggests that the boring logs were included with
the specifications which are a part of the contract documents.
Further, at paragraph 9, clause 2, Thiokol says

"although two

boring logs were provided with the specifications, those logs came
from the M-191 site, 1400 feet south of the project

site and

specifications clearly identify that fact." [emphasis added].
Therefore, once again Thiokol concedes that the boring logs
were

included

evidence

that

in

the

Thiokol

contract
knew

documents.

or

should

have

Perhaps
known

the

best

that

this

provision was included in the contract is its own statement at the
end of the undisputed facts.

Fact No. 1 states: "1.

Thiokol and

Layton executed a purchase order/contract (^purchase order 1 ) dated
July 17, 1986, which included specifications (Nspecificationsf)
for the construction of the project."

(R. at Page 5, Thiokol f s

Brief.
In its memorandum decision the Court states at page 2:
[t]he Court notes that the plans and specifications did
include a representation that soil borings of a
representative area near the building site have been
taken by Chen and Associates.
It is conceded by all
parties that a copy of the boring logs was included which
showed the exact location of the boring site which was
over 1000 feet away from the site in question. [emphasis
added]. (R.1169)
Section 02010 Paragraph 101 has been reproduced in
2

its

entirety below because the provision must be construed
entirety to understand the case.

in its

Clearly the boring logs were part

of the contract documents.
SECTION 02010
SUBSURFACE INVESTIGATIONS
PART 1 - GENERAL
1.01

DESCRIPTION
A.

Soil borings of a representative area
near the building site have been taken by
Chen & Associates, Salt Lake City, UT.

B.

A copy of the boring logs is included.

C.

The soils report was obtained only for
the Engineers use in the design and is
not a part of the Contract Documents.
The log of borings is provided for
Contractors1 information but is not a
warrant of subsurface conditions.
(R.at Exhibit C Appelletefs Brief)
Whenever bits and pieces of this provision from the contract
are asserted by Thiokol, Frontier/Layton would ask the Court to
view such selective treatment of the language in view of the whole
contract provision.
POINT II:

POINTS OF CLARIFICATION AND NOTEWORTHINESS

While it is not Frontier/Layton1 s purpose to try to correct
every misstatement or understatement contained in Thiokol's Brief
because

such,

believe

some

in many
major

instances, is merely

issues

which

might

advocacy,

influence

the

they

do

Court f s

analysis, need to be addressed.
A.

THIOKOL'S CONTRACT DOCUMENTS STATE THAT THE BORING LOGS
3

WERE OF A REPRESENTATIVE AREA NEAR THE SITE.
After a careful reading of Thiokolfs brief it appears that
the words "of a representative area near the building site11 do not
appear

anywhere

axiomatic

to

specifications
contention

in

the

body

of

its

brief.

Frontier/Layton1s

claim

were misleading.

It

that

the

boring

logs

representative of the M-193 area.

that

is

misleading

and

is
and

is Frontier/Layton1s

main

taken

the

clause
plans

from

M-191

are

not

M-191 had clays, sands and

silts while M-193 had cobbles and gravels.
clause

That

inaccurate

as

Consequently, this
a

guide

for

what

a

contractor would have reasonably expected to find at M-193.
B.

AN AFFIRMATIVE STATEMENT WAS MADE.

Throughout
trial

court

statement.

its brief Thiokol takes the position that the

ruled
Upon

that

Thiokol

several

did

readings

not

of

make

the

an

affirmative

Court's

memorandum

decision, we believe that one can only conclude that the Court
determined that there was an affirmative representation, but that
it was accurate or in the alternative that the Court did not reach
the question of whether there was an affirmative representation
and

simply

reasoned

that

even

if

statement the disclaimer overcame it.

there

was

an

affirmative

In numbered paragraph one

(1) of the Court's memorandum decision the court states:

"Even if

the provisions of the contract are considered to indicate that a
soil

boring presented

is a

A

representativef

area, there

is a

specific disclaimer indicating the use to which that information
is

to

be

put."

(R.

1170)
4

Perhaps

a

more

accurate

characterization

of the memorandum

decision

is that the Court

focused on the disclaimer and it was not important to the Court's
analysis whether or not there was an affirmative statement.

Under

Frontier/Layton's view of the applicable law, it does not matter
if there was an affirmative statement or not.

Parson talks about

misleading plans and specifications not affirmative statements.
Perhaps this Honorable Court may determine that a misleading plan
or specification can not exist without a misleading affirmative
statement, but that is not a stated element of the criteria set
out in Parson.
were

"of

a

In any event, the statement that the boring logs

representative

area

near

the

building

site"

is

obviously an affirmative statement.
C.

WERE THE BORING LOGS "DISTANT" OR "NEAR".

As a subissue, Thiokol states at page 21 of its brief "the
boring logs were from a distant site."

The contract documents say

"boring logs of a representative area near the building site have
been taken"

(R. at Thiokolfs brief page 21)

[emphasis added].

While it is agreed that M-191 is approximately 1400 feet away it
is obvious that minds differ on the objective meaning of the term
"near."

The real issue is not whether 1400 feet is near or far

from the building site but whether the boring logs were misleading
and whether or not Frontier Foundations was entitled to rely on
those boring logs when preparing its bid.
boring
building

logs

were

site,

taken

Thiokol

from

a

representative

manifested

an

contractors rely on this representation.
5

By stating that the

intent

area
to

near

the

have

the

POINT III:

WHICH LAW GOVERNS

Once again, Thiokol resorts to arguing

its case based on

Federal Law including Weeks Dredging Contracting, Inc. v. U.S., 13
CI. Ct. 193 1987, afffd 861 F. 2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

The facts

that give rise to the instant lawsuit indicate that it is a claim
for Type 1 differing site conditions for a private contract in the
State

of

Utah.

Acquisition

A

Federal

Regulation

Court's

52:236-2

is

interpretation
not

of

Federal

determinative.

The

differing site conditions clause in question is a typical one.
This Honorable Court should apply the law as set forth in Parson
arid Thorn and there is no reason to do otherwise.
Frontier/Layton agree that this is a case of first impression for
a Utah Appellate Court and accordingly asks for a written opinion
from the Appellate Court so that the citizens of Utah have a clear
statement

of the

impression
contract

law.

before

the

distinction

However, the issue that
Court
and

is the

not

the

"private" versus
interpretation

Acquisition Regulation 52:236-2 and 52:236-3.
Court

cases

of

Jack

B.

Parson

is of

Const.

Co.

of

first
"public"
Federal

The Utah Supreme
v.

State

of

Utah

Department of Transportation, 725 P.2d 614 (Utah 1986) and Thorn
Construction Company, Inc. vs. Utah Department of Transportation,
598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979) each dealt with a Type 1 differing site
conditions claim.
Frontier/Layton

Although both cases involved public contracts,

assert that the statement

of

law contained

in

Parson is the appropriate standard for a Type 1 differing site
claim in Utah, whether for a public or private contract, and is as
6

follows:
A contractor of public works who, acting reasonably, is
misled by incorrect plans and specifications issued by
the public authorities as the basis for bids and who, as
a result, submits a bid which is lower than he would have
otherwise made may recover [damages] in a contract
action.
Id at 616.
Thiokol's position seems to be that because the boring logs
came from somewhere other than

the project site itself that under

the holding of Weeks there can be no misleading statement and hence
no differing conditions.
standard

that

a

Conversely, Parson and Thorn set the

contractor

may

recover

if

he

is

"misled

by

incorrect plans and specifications" that were issued as a basis for
bid.
I

Parson at 616.

differing

site

Parson and Thorn are the law governing Type
conditions

clause

in

this

jurisdiction.

Furthermore, Weeks is distinguishable upon its facts.
Weeks was a case where the plaintiff, Weeks Dredging, had
contracted with the Corps of Army Engineers to dredge a channel in
a harbor on what was called the Tennessee-Tombigee Waterway (TennTom).

The reason the Court ruled against Weeks was because it

failed

to

encountered
nothing

prove

that

the

were actually

changed

conditions

at the project

to do with whether boring

logs

site.
from

it

allegedly

The case had

another

dredging

location had been included in the plans and specifications, but
rather where in fact changed conditions were encountered.
To understand the Weeks case, basic terminology and background
is essential.

The contract amount was determined by cubic yards

7

of material to be dredged.

The dredged material was broken down

into pay yardage and non-pay yardage.

As the term suggests, the

contractor got paid for pay yardage and did not get paid for nonpay yardage.

When the Corps of Engineers determined what channel

depth and configuration it wanted in the

lf

Tenn-Tomlf waterway, it

created what was called the minimum pay template, which is what the
bottom of the waterway needed to conform to regarding depth and
width, to conform with the contract.

The Corps realizes that in

order to effect the minimum pay template, that the contractor was
going to have to do some overdredging and so they allowed for some
amount of overdredging

on the bottom

and sides to effect the

minimum pay template.

This overdredging amount was called the

maximum pay template, in other words, the maximum the Corps was
going to pay to effect the minimum of what it needed.

Anything

beyond the scope of the maximum pay template was overdredging of
what was previously called non-pay yardage.
When Weeks set about performing its contract, it took daily
samples

of

the

distinguish

material

that

it

encountered.

It

did

not

between which materials had come from outside the

maximum pay template, or non-pay yardage, and material which had
come from inside the maximum pay template, for which Weeks could
have

been

compensated.

Because

of

essentially

Weeks 1

sloppy

sampling and classification of samples, the Court held Weeks had
failed to prove its case because it had failed to prove that the
changed

conditions

maximum

pay

existed within the contract

template.

There

was
8

no

way

for

site, i.e.
the

Court

the
to

distinguish between dredged materials that had been dredged outside
of the project site and those that had been dredged inside
project site.

the

Hence the language "at the project site11, that

occasionally appears in the Weeks holding and presumably Thiokol's
usage of it in the instant case.

However, the Court specifically

states in language quoted hereinafter, that the case was really not
about misleading plans and specifications, but was rather about the
failure to provide adequate proof. The critical language in Weeks
Dredging Contracting, Inc. v. U.S., 13 CI. Ct. 193 1987, afffd 861
F. 2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988)

that illustrates its nonapplicability

to the facts of the instant case is as follows:
At closing arguments, the defendant focused its primary
argument(s) from the foregoing (while not abandoning the same)
and now emphasizes what it perceived to be a more fundamental
failure of proof by the plaintiff.
According to the
defendant, it is a simple fact that plaintiff's case is
fatally flawed in that all of plaintiff's proof relates to an
alleged differing site condition occurring at the wrong site.
Instead of posturing its differing site condition claim by
comparing the various estimated materials within the contract
site (i.e., the maximum pay template) with the same categories
of materials actually dredged in that same contract site (as
it must), plaintiff erroneously compared, avers defendant, the
categories of estimated materials within the maximum pay
template, with the categories of materials actually dredged
in the contract site plus an area of admitted 2 0 to 2 5%
overdredging
occurring
outside of the contract site.
Plaintiff's failure to factor out the quantum of "non-pay"
materials it dredged outside the maximum pay template, from
the "pay" materials it dredged within the contract site,
leaves the Court with no relevant comparative basis by which
to test for the existence of any material differing site
condition occurring within the relevant contract site. . . .
. . . After thoroughly reviewing all of the evidence in
the record, we are of the opinion that plaintiff is not
entitled to an equitable adjustment based on differing site
conditions for excess gravel, excess cutaw, and oversize
gravel. While all of our reasons for this decision are set
out more fully below, the primary, but not the only, basis
for our decision is the failure of proof. In essence, try as
9

we did to find probative evidence in the record which would
permit us to make a valid comparison between materials
expected (indicated by the IFB) and materials truly dredged,
all within the actual contract area, we are forced to conclude
that plaintiff has simply failed to adduce fundamental proof
of the latter element, i.e., the quantum of the various
materials actually dredged within the relevant contract
(maximum pay template) area. . . . [Emphasis Added].
Id. at 197.
Weeks further states:
At the outset we noted, and now re-emphasize, that while
this is a Type I differing site condition case, it is not, in
major part, one which seeks equitable adjustment because the
subsurface materials actually encountered subsurface materials
actually encountered differed materially in character and
nature from the subsurface materials depicted in the contract
documents.
Here, plaintiff contests the nature of the
subsurface materials only as to the minor extent it allegedly
encountered gravel larger in size than that depicted in the
contract documents. [Emphasis in original].
Id. at 217.
If you were comparing apples to apples between the instant
case and the Weeks case, Frontier/Layton

would have to be making

a claim for sheet piles that had been driven at some location other
than the site location of M-193.
about.

This is not what this case is

Frontier/Layton1s claim, simply stated, is that defendant

included reports of subsurface conditions which were characterized
as being representative of the contract area.
specifications

were misleading

and

inaccurate

Those plans and
and

thus

caused

Frontier/Layton to submit a bid lower than it otherwise would have.
This case is not about Frontier/Layton

making a claim for changed

conditions on work that it completed outside of the contract site.
It should be noted, however, that Parson and Thorn have no such "at
the project site" language in them, but rather talk in terms of
10

misleading plans or specifications.
Therefore, Weeks, in its bare essentials, does not apply to
the facts of this case or to the purpose for which defendant
purports to assert it.
be discarded.

For that reason, if no other, Weeks should

However, an even more compelling reason to discard

Weeks is because it is not the law of this jurisdiction.

Parson

and Thorn are the law of this jurisdiction and the paragraph of
Parson above quoted is the standard that applies for a changed
condition claim in the State of Utah.
POINT IV:

THIOKOL'S
DISCLAIMER
DOES
NOT
OVERCOME THE INCLUSION OF INACCURATE
AND MISLEADING INFORMATION

Once again Thiokol resorts to using Federal Law citing P.J.
Maffei Bldg. Wrecking Corp. v. U.S., 732 F.2d 913 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
when in fact our own Utah Supreme Court in Parson and Thorn has
spoken on the matter.

In both Parson and Thorn a State Agency had

given or withheld information regarding the suitability of borrow
pits for highway construction projects.
borrow material proved not appropriate.

In both instances the
Jack B. Parson Const. Co.

v. State of Utah Department of Transportation, 725 P.2d 614 (Utah
1986) analyzed it as follows:
UDOT asserts that, assuming there were errors on the
sheets, the
information there presented
was not
misleading if considered together with other available
information.
And UDOT asserts that a bidder is
chargeable with constructive knowledge of any information
it could have obtained by contacting prior contractors
and by searching the state's files.
Information
available from these sources would have put sheets 2B and
44 in perspective and resulted in an accurate picture of
the prospects. To support this claim of a general duty
to inquire and the consequent assertion of constructive
knowledge, UDOT relies on a general disclaimer and a
11

reference in the contract documents to the availability
of other materials. As Thorn held, a general disclaimer
or reference to other materials is ineffective to qualify
a specific misleading representation; the general duty
such a disclaimer imposes is superseded by a specific,
positive misstatement, and the bidder is not required to
search further for the facts. Thorn Construction co. v.
Utah Department of Transportation, 598 P. 2d at 367-68;
cf. L.A. Young Sons Construction Co. v. County of Tooele,
575
P.2d
1034
(Utah
1978)
(no
evidence
of
misrepresentation of critical fact).
This Court's refusal in Thorn to permit a general
disclaimer to impose a requirement that a bidder must
investigate
the
state's
specific
affirmative
representations to determine their truth has a sound
basis in policy.
Permitting a bidder to rely upon
affirmative statements will place responsibility for the
accuracy of bidding information on the party best suited
to determine whether it is misleading—the state.
11
also obviates the necessity for bidders to pad their bids
to protect against unexpected costs that may be incurred
as
a
result
of
carelessly
prepared
plans
and
specifications. On the other hand, the rule urged upon
us by UDOT can only be expected to encourage sloppy work
by those preparing plans and specifications and to
increase the cost of state projects, for no better reason
than to relieve the state's employees of any duty to be
accurate in representing facts known to them. [Emphasis
added].
Id. at 617.
The operative language from Thorn Construction Company, Inc.
vs. Utah Department of Transportation, 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979)
which dealt with a circumstance similar to that of Parson is as
follows:
It was held that the contractor was entitled to rely on
the representation made, notwithstanding the existence
of general language in another section of the contracts
requiring the contractor to satisfy himself as to the
character, quality and quantity of surface and subsurface
materials were obstacles to be encountered. f if [omitting
citations emphasis added]

12

There is little or no difference between what occurred in this
case and what happened in Parson and Thorn.
When Thiokol's argument is boiled down to its essence it is
no different than what the state was trying to argue in Parson.
Thiokol seems to be saying that because the disclaimer was included
that

Frontier/Layton

had

no right to rely

on the

affirmative

statement regarding the boring logs, but rather was burdened with
the responsibility to search further for the truth.

In its brief

at paragraph 2 of the statement of undisputed facts, Thiokol seems
to be advancing some of the same arguments advanced by the State
in Parson.
c.
The contractor shall make every effort to
familiarize himself with prevailing work conditions and
is not relieved from responsibility for performing work
without additional cost to Thiokol by his failure to do
so.
Specifications, General Requirements at Paragraph
1.11; FAR 52.236-3. (R. 544).
d.
Prior to starting work, the contractor will
become
familiar
with
site
conditions
concerning
excavation, filling and grading.
Specifications,
Excavation, Filling and Grading at 3.01(A). (R.545).
Furthermore, Thiokol has argued strenuously that because of
Mr. Liu's training, some constructive knowledge or other duty was
imposed on Frontier/Layton.
The boring logs have very specific, affirmative, identifiable
information

that

was

unquestionably

included

in

the

contract

documents.

Disclaimers regarding those boring logs and general

reference to other provisions in the contract do not supercede the
inclusion of the information.
The

whole

of

Thiokolfs

argument
13

seems

to

be

that

if

Frontier/Layton had any doubts about the accuracy of the boring
logs they should have done something on their own to check it out.
To suggest that Frontier/Layton should have done something more or
something

different

to

ascertain

the

veracity

of

the

representations made about the boring logs is contrary to existing
law.

In its simplest form, that is what the disclaimer argument

is about.

Should Frontier/Layton have done something different to

prove the accuracy of the boring logs that were included or were
they entitled to rely on them?

The record indicates that there was

no other information about subsurface soil conditions.

Further,

there is no evidence that any other contractors performed their own
subsurface soils testing prior to bidding.
at

least

the

testimony

of

Robert

The record does include

Weyher

of

Weyher

Brothers

Construction, who bid the project with the intent of doing their
own pile driving, and he specifically stated that he did not do any
subsurface testing (Robert Frederick Weyher Deposition, Pages 14,
line 10 to 15, line 10 at Record, Exhibit E to Frontier/Laytonf s
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R.
569-594).

Clearly, the law announced in Parson and Thorn as well

as other cases indicates that a contractor is entitled to rely on
information that is included in contract documents.
As Justice Zimmerman stated it in Parson quoted above, there
are good policy reasons why contractors ought to be able to rely
on the information provided in bid documents.

It is not in the

best interest of the public for contractors to bid every project
based on a worst case scenario.
14

Tooele, 575 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1978) cited by Thiokol is of no help
to its case.

Simply stated, and as noted in the analysis of

Parson, L.A. Young is distinguishable on its facts.

In L.A. Young

the Court specifically found that the water table information was
not part of the contract documents and, even if it had been part
of the contract documents the information was an accurate statement
of the circumstances from where the test information was taken.
Finally, there were no statements in L.A. Young made that the
information in question represented conditions at the project site.
Therefore, L.A. Young is distinguishable because the Court found
that the information in question in that case was not included in
the

contract

documents

and

no

statements

were

made

that

the

information in question represented conditions at the site.
Thiokol essentially argues that because the boring logs were
accurate for M-191, where they were taken, that this case squares
up with

the L.A. Young holding.

However, that analysis totally

ignores the contract language which states that "boring logs of a
representative area near the building site were taken11. Therefore,
the

boring

logs,

while

representative

for

M-191,

were

not

representative for M-193, the contract site, as they were purported
to be.
POINT V:

FRONTIER/LAYTONf S

RELIANCE

WAS

REASONABLE
Thiokol argues because (1) the boring logs were taken from a
"distant site"

(page 21 Thiokol brief), (2) Jim McLean said that
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conditions can change in as little as 10 feet (R. 125 Deposition
of Peter Roderick McLean, pages 27-28), and because (3) Mr. Liu
said that he did not interpret the contract documents to say that
M-191 would be "identical"

(R. 123 Deposition of Jeong "Julian"

S. Liu, page 27-28) that there could have been no reasonable
reliance.
First,

Mr.

Foundations.

McLean

was

not

bid

this

job

for

Frontier

Thiokol recognizes this fact in paragraph 5 of its

statement of the facts.
McLean

did

a

drilling

Thiokol said Mr. Liu bid the job.
supervisor.

Mr.

Liu,

who

has

Mr.

vastly

superior technical training in the area of soils conditions, was
the party responsible for making the bid for Frontier Foundations.

Mr. Liu stated that because the soils

information, which

includes the boring logs, was good enough for the engineer who
designed the sheet pile system, it was good enough to bid the
project.

The engineer intrinsically relies on the same kind of

information to design the sheet pile system as does the sheet pile
driver who bids the project. (R. 123 Deposition of Jeong "Julian"
S. Liu, page 20). Further, Mr. Liu in his deposition

stated that

because the M-193 site was higher and further away from the creek
bed than was the M-191 site, that he would expect conditions more
favorable

not

less

favorable.

(R.

123

Deposition

of

Jeong

"Julian" S. Liu, page 21, 22 abd 23)
Obviously, Thiokol believed the conditions at the location of
the boring logs were representative of the conditions of the M-193
16

site

or

they

would

representative

area.

relied

to

on

it

not

have

said

If Thiokol!s

design

the

sheet

the

logs

engineers
pile

were

believed

system,

Frontier/Layton be expected to do otherwise.

why

from

a

it and
should

It should be noted

that when the differing conditions were encountered, Thiokol chose
to believe that the site had been "seeded" (R. 469) rather than to
believe that gravel and cobble had actually

been

encountered.

Thiokol obviously did not expect gravel and cobble and were very
surprised that it was encountered.
Jim Nordquist the engineer for Chen and Associates, which did
the field testing for the boring logs in question, stated in his
affidavit that is was reasonable for Frontier/Layton to rely on
the boring logs and that they really had no practical choice but
to do so.

(R. at Exhibit K to Frontier/Layton! s Memorandum

in

Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at Pages 569-594).
Robert Weyher

stated

in his deposition that his company,

Weyher Brothers, bid this job planning to do their own sheet pile
work.

Weyher

investigation

Brothers

did

not

do

any

independent

field

in preparation of its bid to Thiokol but rather

relied on the information provided by the boring logs to prepare
its bid.

(R. at Exhibit E to Brief of Appellant at Page 15).

The issue is not whether the boring logs were "distant" as
Thiokol now characterizes them or "near" as the contract documents
state, or whether in fact Mr. Liu thought they would be identical
or

not.

The

issue

is

whether

it

was

reasonable

for

Frontier/Layton to assume the boring logs were representative of
17

the

conditions

to

be

encountered.

Thiokol

said

they

were

representative and Frontier/Layton strongly believed and relied on
them.

In view of the current case law on disclaimers and public

policy as stated by Justice Zimmermanfs statement in Parson at
page 617, Thiokol must not be allowed to escape liability for
these representations.
POINT VI:

Reliance was reasonable.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR MORTON THIOKOL

INAPPROPRIATE
AND
WAS
PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GRANTED FOR FRONTIER/LAYTON
In the final paragraph of Thiokolfs Brief Point III and in
the beginning of its Point IV it talks about the appropriateness
of determining reasonable reliance and other elements in a Type 1
differing sites claim at Summary Judgment.

Thiokol attempts to

analyze the appropriateness of the Court's ruling in this case on
the elements of the Weeks case.
jurisdiction.

Frontier/Layton assert that Parson and Thorn are

the law of this jurisdiction.
state

that

Weeks is not the law of this

a

contractor

can

Parson in its simplest elements
make

out

a

claim

for

a Type

1

differing site conditions if (1) there were misleading plans and
specifications;

(2) the contractor

reasonably

relied

on

those

misleading plans and specifications; and (3) was damaged because
they caused him to submit a bid lower than he otherwise would
have.
Element

I:

The bid documents

included

"representative area near the building site.11

boring

logs of a

Whether they were

"near" as the contract documents indicate or "distant" as Thiokol
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would have us now believe because they were 14 00 feet away is not
the

dispositive

issue.

They

were

included

and

they

were

misleading.
Element II: The next question is whether Frontier!s reliance
on the contract documents was reasonable. The boring logs were all
that were given about the subsoil conditions.

They were part of

the soils report and were intended for the engineers to rely on
when designing the project.

Engineers use substantially the same

kind of information to design a project as a contractor needs to
bid a project site.

M-193 was higher and further away from the

creek bed than M-191.

This would suggest more favorable not less

favorable conditions.

Three experts, Mr. Liu, Mr. Weyher and Mr.

Nordquist have confirmed that it was reasonable to rely on the
boring

logs.

Public policy as announced

by Justice

Zimmerman

suggests that the responsibility for veracity ought to rest with
the

owner

and

not

the

contractor

for

the

information contained in its bid documents.
McLean,

who

was

never

involved

in

accuracy

of

the

The testimony of Mr.

bidding

this

project

for

Frontier Foundations, and the disclaimer relied on by Thiokol are
not

sufficient

to

establish

Thiokol!s

position

that

Frontier/Layton acted unreasonably and thus take this case out of
the realm of reasonable reliance.
Element III:

Frontier/Layton left the issue of damages to be

determined by the trial Court and did not make it a matter of its
Motion

for

question

Partial

that

the

Summary
job took

Judgment.

However,

substantially
19

longer

there
and

is

no

required

different, more costly, methods and techniques to complete the
project than would have been required if the conditions would have
been

sands,

clays

and

silts

as

was

represented

in

the

bid

documents rather than the gravels and cobbles that were found.
Frontier/Layton urge that there was ample testimony, even
construing

all of the testimony

in a light most

favorable to

Thiokol, to grant summary judgment in favor of Frontier/Layton.
Conversely,

in view of the expert testimony and public policy

reasons offered by Frontier/Layton, at a very minimum there were
factual issues raised under the analysis advanced by Thiokol which
should

have

Thiokolfs

barred

Consequently,

there

was

Motion

for

sufficient

Summary

evidence

Judgment.
to

grant

Frontier/Layton1s motion and Thiokolfs motion should not have been
granted.
CONCLUSION
Frontier/Layton

assert that the

law of this

jurisdiction

regarding Type 1 differing site conditions is Parson and Thorn.
Under Parson the elements of a differing site claim reduced to
simple

elements

specifications;
misleading

are
(2)

plans

Frontier/Layton

as

follows:

detrimental
and

asserts

(1)

misleading

reasonable

specifications;
that

it

has

met

plans

and

upon

the

reliance
and

(3)

damages.

its

burden

to

show

entitlement under Parson to a Type 1 differing site condition
claim, reserving the issue of damages for trial.
Frontier/Layton asserts that it is not whether the boring
logs were

"distant" as Thiokol
20

would

now

have us

believe

or

"near",

as

the

contract

documents

state,

but

whether

the

terminology "boring logs of a representative area near the site11
was misleading.

Reliance on the boring logs was reasonable in

light of the expert testimony and case law on disclaimers and
public policy

as announced in Parson.

In accordance herewith Frontier/Layton respectfully asks the
Court to reverse the decision of the trial court which granted
Thiokol's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Frontier/Layton1s
Motion

for Partial

Summary Judgment with

instructions

for the

trial court to grant Frontier/Layton1s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment as to the entitlement question with the issue of damages
to be reserved for trial.
DATED this

f)-/

day of February, 1991.

Attorney for Appellants
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